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Negotiation Ethics for Real World Interactions
CHARLES B. CRAVER*
On the one hand the negotiator must be fair and truthful; on the other he
must mislead his opponent. Like the poker player, a negotiator hopes that
his opponent will overestimate the value of his hand. Like the poker
player ... he must facilitate his opponent's inaccurate assessment. The
critical difference between those who are successful negotiators and those
who are not lies in this capacity both to mislead and not to be misled ... .[A]
careful examination of the behavior of even the most forthright, honest, and
trustworthy negotiators will show them actively engaged in misleading their
opponents about their true positions.. . .To conceal one's true position, to
mislead an opponent about one's true settling point is the essence of
negotiation. 1
[T]he profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard for
attorneys' professional relationships with courts, other lawyers, and the
public: The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith. Another
lawyer ... should not need to exercise the same degree of caution that he
would if trading for reputedly antique copper jugs in an oriental bazaar ...
[S]urely the professional standards must ultimately impose upon him a duty
not to accept an unconscionable deal. While some difficulty in line-drawing
is inevitable when such a distinction is sought to be made, there must be a
point at which the lawyer cannot ethically accept an arrangement that is
completely unfair to the other side .. .2
If we have come to a point where the vast majority of those who study
negotiation across a range of disciplines would prescribe collaboration and
problem-solving over haggling and contention because it produces better
* Freda H. Alverson Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D.,
1971, University of Michigan; M. Indus. & Lab. Rels., 1968, Cornell University School
of Industrial & Labor Relations; B.S., 1967, Cornell University.
I James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 926, 927-28 (1980); see Walter W. Steele, Jr.,
Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1395 (1986)
("Deceitful or not, lies about price, value, and some other matters are practically
sacrosanct to conventional negotiation. If lawyers were forbidden from engaging in these
lies, they would be at a tremendous disadvantage when negotiating with any
nonlawyer.").
2 Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV.
577, 589, 591 (1975).
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results for clients, why would the legal profession continue to allow lawyers
to choose an outdated, less effective approach to negotiation? 3
"Should we base our negotiation ethics rules and practices on the current
empirical reality of expectations of 'generally accepted conventions'
('background norms') or should we aspire to make current practices more
fair or just?" 4
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers negotiate repeatedly. They actually engage in bargaining
interactions when they do not even appreciate the fact that they are
negotiating. They interact with colleagues within their own firms, and they
interact with prospective clients and current clients. They also negotiate on
behalf of clients with external parties. Transactional attorneys work to
structure diverse business arrangements, while litigators endeavor to resolve
disputes.5 For decades, most law schools did not offer courses in negotiation,
apparently believing that such practical lawyering skills should not-or could
not-be taught in law school class settings. They seemed to think that such
skills could best be learned through on-the-job training once students entered
legal practice. 6
Over the past twenty-five years, most law schools have recognized the
critical nature of negotiation skills, and they have established separate legal
negotiation courses or incorporated negotiation training in alternative dispute
resolution courses. When these courses were created, many teachers felt
uncomfortable with the bargaining tactics discussed in negotiation books and
being employed by students. Students who wished to obtain beneficial terms
for their fictional clients over- and under-stated what they had to achieve or
3 Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for Process-
Enabling Ethical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 33 (2005).
4 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility in
Negotiation, in DIsPuTE RESOLUTION ETHics 119, 120 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth
eds., 2002).
5 They are usually successful, since fewer than five percent of cases are actually
resolved by trials in federal and state courts. This fact would suggest that the term
"litigator" is overused today, and trial attorneys could more reasonably be characterized
as "problem solvers" or "dispute resolvers."
6 When I entered full-time law school teaching thirty-five years ago, I requested the
opportunity to teach a legal negotiating course similar to the one I was then teaching as
an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley. My new dean immediately
rejected this proposal, indicating that such a practical course had no place in a law school
curriculum.
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were willing to give up if mutual accords were going to be achieved. People
like James J. White realized that the most effective way to induce students to
work diligently on negotiation exercises involved a system in which the
negotiation exercise results affected final course grades.7
Over the past thirty-five years, I have taught a two or three credit hour
legal negotiation course. The students are assigned chapters in my book,
Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement.8 We explore the impact of:
negotiator styles; the six stages of the negotiation process; verbal and
nonverbal communication; negotiation techniques; the impact of such factors
as anchoring, gain/loss framing, the endowment effect, the ego-centric bias,
the attribution bias, and regret aversion; specific negotiation issues such as
telephone and e-mail interactions; and negotiation ethics. We contrast
distributive bargaining designed to maximize own-side returns with
integrative bargaining designed to maximize the joint returns achieved by the
parties.
During the term, the students engage in a series of negotiation exercises.
Everyone receives identical general information which describes the relevant
circumstances involved. The students are paired, and the individuals on each
side receive confidential information pertaining to their fictional clients. The
confidential information provides them with information concerning their
respective clients, informs them of the specific issues to be negotiated, and
assigns point values for each term to be addressed. Students can use these
point structures to determine the overall value of any agreement achieved.
They are also told how they will be evaluated if no agreement is reached. In
most cases, they are told that if they do not obtain accords, they will be
placed at the bottom of the individuals on their side. In other cases, they are
told that nonsettlement parties will flip coins, role dice, or pull numbers out
of a box containing a specified number of different nonsettlement results.
The first three or four interactions involve practice exercises designed to
introduce students to the negotiation process; these do not affect their course
grades. They are then assigned five or six additional exercises that do impact
their grades. At the conclusion of each bargaining interaction, the students on
each side are ranked from high to low. If there are twenty-five pairs
negotiating, the most successful students on each side get twenty-five
placement points, the second highest students get twenty-four placement
points, and so forth. Some exercises are conducted on a one-on-one basis,
7 See generally James. J. White, The Lawyer as a Negotiator: An Adventure in
Understanding and Teaching the Art ofNegotiation, 19 J. LEGAL EDUc. 337 (1967).
8 CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (6th ed.
2009).
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while others are done on a two-on-two basis. I provide partners to assist them
with the more complex exercises, and to teach them how to interact
effectively with persons on the same side.
Two-thirds of student course grades are determined by their comparative
negotiation exercise results, the other one-third is based on a ten-fifteen page
paper they must prepare evaluating different aspects of their negotiation
exercises. If students do not feel comfortable with the overt grade
competition associated with the class exercises, they may take the course on
a credit/no-credit basis. I inform the students that I grade generously, and
guarantee the credit/no-credit students passing grades if they work on the
assigned exercises and prepare acceptable class papers. I strongly urge
students concerned about the competitive aspect of the grading process to
take the class on a credit/no-credit basis. Due to the relatively generous
grading curve we have at George Washington University, most students now
take the course for a regular grade.
The students who take the course for traditional letter grades work
diligently on the assigned exercises. They carefully review the general
information and confidential information sheets, and many do legal or factual
research through Lexis, Westlaw, or the Internet. The students who take the
course on a credit/no-credit basis do not work nearly as hard, and this lack of
commitment is reflected in their negotiation performances. The students who
take the class for letter grades achieve significantly better results on their
negotiation exercises than their classmates who elect the credit/no-credit
option. 9
Over the past several years, I have taught a one credit hour negotiation
class at George Washington University which meets for three and one-half
hours on four consecutive Friday mornings. I have also taught the Peter
Bronstein Negotiation Institute to 120 students each year at the University of
Virginia Law School, which meets on two consecutive Saturdays each fall.
Both of these intensive one credit hour courses must be taken on a credit/no-
credit basis. Although we cover the same concepts in these courses as we do
in my full semester class, and the students engage in a series of similar
negotiation exercises, they do not take the exercises as seriously. As I watch
different pairs negotiate, I can see how relaxed they are compared to
traditional grade students in my full semester class. They have a good time
interacting with other students, and clearly do not worry about the actual
results they achieve.
9 See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of a Pass/Fail Option on Negotiation Course
Performance, 48 J. LEGAL EDUc. 176, 183 (1998); see also Charles B. Craver, The
Impact of Student GPAs and a Pass/Fail Option on Clinical Negotiation Course
Performance, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 373, 374 (2000).
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As greater numbers of law professors began to teach negotiation courses,
they became uncomfortable with student competition associated with
exercises that affected course grades. They apparently felt that second and
third year law students should not be exposed to the types of bargaining
environments they would encounter when they enter legal practice. The
teachers feared that such competitive interactions would be too traumatic for
sensitive students. These teachers thus developed what has become known as
the communitarian approach.
The communitarian style is based on the integrative bargaining concepts
developed over one hundred years ago by Mary Parker Follettle and explored
in the mid-1960s by Professors Walton and McKersie.11 This approach
gained general law school acceptance following the publication of Getting to
Yes by Roger Fisher and William Ury.12 This style is based on the theory that
most negotiations do not involve conflicted issues. If negotiators examine
both party's seemingly diametric positions and explore the parties'
underlying interests, they often discover solutions beneficial to both sides.
Two persons are trying to decide how to divide an orange they both want. It
may seem fair to divide it in half, until they discover that one wants the pulp
to make juice while the other wants the rind to make zest. This discovery
permits them to give one all of the pulp and the other all of the rind.13
Communitarians believe "that negotiation is a moral and ethical process,
worthy of deep philosophical, political, legal and human respect."' 4 Their
approach requires negotiating parties to be completely open and honest with
each other with respect to their true interests and settlement intentions.15
10 See JOAN C. TONN, MARY P. FOLLETT: CREATING DEMOCRACY, TRANSFORMING
MANAGEMENT 360-88 (2003).
11 See RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. McKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF
LABOR NEGOTIATIONs (1965).
12 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981).
13 A similar story concerns two children trying to decide how to divide a piece of
cake. It might seem fair to have one cut the cake and let the other select the piece she
wants. If the right question is asked first, however, one may indicate a preference for
icing and the other a preference for cake, allowing each child to get 100 percent of what
he or she actually prefers.
14 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Ethics of Compromise, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK 155, 156 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
15 See Mark Young, Sharks, Saints, and Samurai: The Power of Ethics in
Negotiations, 24 NEGOT. J. 145, 150 (2008) (exhorting negotiators to always behave
honorably simply because opponents deserve to be treated fairly). See generally Robert P.
Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FoRDHAM L. REV. 691 (2001);
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Each side must candidly indicate the terms they desire and the true value
placed on each term to enable the parties to achieve "Pareto" optimal
agreements which satisfy the underlying interests of each (i.e., "win-win"
agreements instead of what are often characterized by commentators as "win-
lose" accords that favor one side over the other). If negotiators are not
entirely truthful with respect to their real interests and values, inefficiencies
result or potentially beneficial accords are not achieved.
Communitarians do not like to engage in conventional distributive
bargaining in which the opposing parties use deceptive tactics to claim more
than a fair share for themselves. They have thus created a world in which
negotiators have underlying interests that do not conflict with each other.16
Side A gives Side B what it prefers to have, while Side B gives Side A what it
wants. The negotiators use a cooperative/problem-solving style which
generates mutually beneficial and jointly efficient accords, instead of a
competitive/adversarial style which produces one-sided and inefficient
agreements.
Communitarians eschew deceptive bargaining tactics. They believe that
attorneys should not be allowed to over- or under-state the way they actually
value the different terms being exchanged, they do not think that lawyers
should be permitted to misrepresent their true settlement intentions, and they
believe that tactics such as bluffing should be proscribed.' 7 This approach is
based upon the naive belief that attorney bargaining interactions are
primarily integrative with few conflicting underlying interests. It assumes
that lawyers rarely have to deal with distributive items that both sides value
and wish to claim for themselves. It ignores the fact that in legal interactions,
"opportunities for integrative bargaining are not nearly as pervasive as is
sometimes authoritatively asserted,"18 due to the fact that monetary issues
tend to dominate such circumstances.
[M]ost negotiations are "mixed motive"; they include both opportunities for
joint gain, and opportunities for grabbing more from the other
Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 411 (1988-89); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as
Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REv. 63 (2002).
16 See generally Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and
Limitations of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We
Can't All Just Get Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2007).
17 See Chris Provis, Ethics, Deception and Labor Negotiation, 28 J. Bus. ETHICS 145
(Nov. 2000). See generally Bordone, supra note 3.
18 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits ofIntegrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 372
(1996).
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side ... [S]trategies that are wise for creating are often opposite from those
that are wise for claiming (e.g., deception about positions and power is
necessary for claiming, while deception about interests is disruptive for
creating). But all negotiations include both elements, and few negotiations
occur where a wise negotiator would not employ at least some of each set of
behaviors. Indeed, one of the more interesting challenges faced by
negotiators is how to balance both of these elements. 19
When they teach legal negotiation courses, communitarians value
agreements that maximize the joint returns achieved and that fairly divide the
different items between the negotiating parties. Students who adhere to this
standard earn higher grades, while students who behave competitively and
obtain terms more beneficial to themselves than to the other side earn lower
grades. The students are thus rewarded for their complete openness regarding
their underlying interests and settlement intentions, and for their ability to
reach agreements that are of equal value to both sides.
This Article will initially discuss the current ethical rules governing
lawyer conduct during bargaining interactions, and the standards that
communitarians would like to impose on practicing attorneys. It will then
explore the different negotiator styles employed by legal practitioners to see
which ethics approach is most reflective of real world encounters. It will then
examine the way in which the Model Rules and traditional concepts of fraud
should be applied to overt misrepresentations, partial disclosures, and
nondisclosures. Inappropriate tactics and unconscionable agreements will
then be assessed. The article will finally evaluate the ethical issues associated
with the collaborative and cooperative law movements which are based on
the communitarian approach.
II. ETHICAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO BARGAINING INTERACTIONS
When I teach negotiation skills to law students or to practicing attorneys,
I often ask if they can lie during their interactions. They usually respond
negatively. I then talk about two lawyers engaged in a negotiation where Side
A is authorized to accept anything over $100,000 while Side B is authorized
to pay anything up to $130,000. We thus have a $30,000 zone of possible
agreement between the $100,000 and $130,000 positions. The parties begin
19 Raymond A. Friedman & Debra Shapiro, Deception and Mutual Gains
Bargaining: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 11 NEGOT. J. 243, 247 (1995); see id at 248-
49; Gary T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and
Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69, 75 (1982); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics ofLying in
Negotiation, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1245-48 (1990).
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with small talk, and then move on to the serious discussions. At an
appropriate point, Side A says it can't accept anything less than $160,000,
and Side B responds that it can't go a penny over $70,000. Both sides are
pleased that they have begun the process successfully, yet they have both
begun with bold-faced lies.
Audience members become uncomfortable. They all recall times they
have commenced bargaining encounters with exaggerated position
statements they did not expect their opponents to take literally. I then quote
from Model Rule 4.1 which provides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly
make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person." 20 Rule 4.1 is
a paragon of clarity: A lawyer may not lie. Comment 1 confirms this
interpretation when it states that a "lawyer is required to be truthful when
dealing with others on a client's behalf. . . "21 When is a lie not a lie? When
it is made by a lawyer! Comment 2 acknowledges that attorneys involved in
bargaining interactions have different expectations.
Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend
on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation,
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material
fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a
party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in
this category. . 22
Although Rule 4.1 unequivocally proscribes lawyer prevarication,
comment 2 excludes puffing, embellishment, and dissembling with respect to
20 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2008); see id. at 8.4(c) ("It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."). Friedman and Shapiro suggest:
Negotiators commonly hide their true level of dependency and commonly
exaggerate the value of their options in the event of no agreement, their willingness
and ability to choose other options, and the likelihood that their constituents (whose
supposed demands may even be fabricated) will disapprove of concessions under
discussion.... [W]hether deception is considered ethical or not depends on the
context, not the act of deceiving.
Friedman & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 245.
21 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2008).
22 See id. at cmt. 2; see also Brian C. Haussmann, Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelines
for Settlement Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 CORNELL
L. REv. 1218 (2004); Maurice E. Schweitzer & Rachel Croson, Curtailing Deception:
The Impact ofDirect Questions on Lies and Omissions, 10 INTL. J. CONFLICT MGMT. 225,
227 (1999) ("[N]egotiators typically consider lies about one's reservation price to be
acceptable, but consider fabrications about material facts to be unethical.").
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a negotiator's true settlement objectives. 23 This comment acknowledges the
reality of bargaining interactions between legal practitioners.
[N]egotiation often cannot take place if the parties must reveal the existence
of a principal, their true asking price, or their intention regarding settlement
throughout the bargaining process. Deception concerning value as well as
deception concerning settlement point in particular are consistent with
functionalism because they are recognizable as bargaining techniques and
allow accurate information to be achieved through bargaining.24
The truly ironic aspect of this exception to Rule 4.1 concerns the fact that
there are really only two things that are material when attorneys negotiate.
The legal, factual, economic, political, and cultural issues are all secondary.
What each participant must ascertain is the degree to which the other values
each of the items being discussed and the amount of each that must be
conceded if an agreement is to be achieved. Nonetheless, most practicing
lawyers do not expect such candor. They also realize how difficult it is for
state bar associations to regulate this area due to the private nature of
bargaining interactions.
If one negotiator lies to another, only by happenstance will the other
discover the lie. If the settlement is concluded by negotiation, there will be
no trial, no public testimony by conflicting witnesses, and thus no
opportunity to examine the truthfulness of assertions made during the
negotiation. Consequently, in negotiation, more than in other contexts,
ethical norms can probably be violated with greater confidence that there
will be no discovery and punishment.25
Although lawyer prevarication during bargaining interactions rarely
results in bar disciplinary action, practitioners recognize that other risks are
associated with inappropriately dishonest negotiating conduct. Whether
attorneys function as generalists in smaller communities or specialists in
larger areas, they begin to see the same persons repeatedly. If someone is
23 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 167-68 (1995);
Friedman & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 245; Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Lawyer's
Obligation to Be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S. C. L. REV. 18 1,
183 (1981); Lowenthal, supra note 19, at 101.
24 Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
493, 537 (1989).
25 White, supra note 1, at 926; see also Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying
in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 481,
482 (2009).
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discovered misrepresenting what the other side has the right to know, their
reputation will suffer.26 The persons who discern the violation of trust are
likely to tell others in their own firm. They and their colleagues will often tell
lawyers in other firms. When negotiators can no longer be trusted with
respect to representations pertaining to material factual, economic, or legal
issues, they will find it difficult to interact with others. Instead of accepting
what such individuals say, opponents have to verify everything they assert.
Instead of relying on literal or figurative handshakes, all agreements have to
be reduced to writing and signed. The negotiation process is substantially
undermined, and bargaining interactions take longer and are more difficult.
When I teach my negotiation class, I enforce the Model Rules. If a
student is accused of a violation, a trial takes place in front of the class. In all
the years I have taught my course, I have never had to conduct a trial. Instead
of filing formal charges of deceit, the accusers simply raise the issues
informally before the class. The accusers and the accused are permitted to
explain their positions, and I ask class members whether they think the
conduct in question was appropriate or inappropriate. In most instances,
students suggest that the challenged statements involved mere "puffing" or
acceptable "embellishment." On rare occasions, however, they indicate a
belief that the misrepresentations were improper. By the end of the semester,
the students being discussed end up with one or two nonsettlements simply
because their future opponents do not trust their representations and are
hesitant to enter into agreements with them. If they cannot be sure of the
fundamental information being conveyed by these persons, they do not feel
comfortable interacting with them.27 These results graphically demonstrate to
everyone the importance of relative honesty. While puffing and
embellishment do not undermine future interactions, inappropriate mendacity
makes it difficult for disreputable actors to achieve future accords.28
26 See Peter C. Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An
Exercise in Practical Ethics, 3 Bus. ETHiCS Q. 359, 369 (1993).
27 See Carol M. Rose, Lecture, Trust in the Mirror ofBetrayal, 75 B.U. L. REv. 531,
539-41 (1995).
28 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 160 ("[L]awyers who are perceived as
unethical are also perceived as ineffective."); Debra L. Shapiro, Blair H. Sheppard & Lisa
Cheraskin, Business on a Handshake, 8 NEGOT. J. 365, 366-67 (1992) (discussing the
degree to which mutual trust enables business partners to interact with each other
efficiently and with minimal need for monitoring); see also David A. Lax & James K.
Sebenius, Three Ethical Issues in Negotiation, 2 NEGOT. J. 363, 364 (1986) ("[A] lie
always leaves a drop of poison behind, and even the most dazzling diplomatic success
gained by dishonesty stands on an insecure foundation, for it awakes in the defeated a
party a sense of aggravation, a desire for vengeance, and a hatred which must always be
menace to his foe . . .") (quoting Francois de Callieres).
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Basic trust is essential to bargaining interactions. 29 The participants have
to be willing to disclose their true needs and interests if the negotiators hope
to achieve mutual accords-especially if they hope to generate efficient
agreements.30 If one side does not trust the other, it will be hesitant to
disclose its own confidential information and underlying values, fearing
exploitation by manipulative and less candid opponents. On the other hand,
negotiators must be careful, even when interacting with honest opponents,
not to be too forthcoming, lest they naively permit skilled adversaries to
claim an excessive share of the surplus involved.31
Communitarian professors I know do not simply require their students to
comply with Model Rule 4.1 and the exceptions set forth in Comment 2 with
respect to bargaining interactions. They instead proscribe traditional
"puffing," "embellishment," and bluffing. They require their students to be
entirely candid regarding their underlying interests, the degree to which they
value those interests, and the terms they have to obtain if minimally
acceptable agreements are to be achieved. They praise students who generate
efficient agreements that divide the items to be negotiated on a relatively
equal basis. They indicate that students who obtain one-sided accords
favoring their own sides will be down-graded, even if they obtain these
results honestly.
The Model Rules are somewhat ambiguous when they endeavor to define
the duty owed by attorneys to their clients. The Preamble states that when
negotiating on behalf of a client, "a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the
client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others."32
Rule 1.3 indicates that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence . .. in
representing a client."33 Comment 1 expands upon this fiduciary obligation:
29 See generally Roy Lewicki, Trust and Distrust, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK, supra note 14, at 191, 196-99 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher
Honeyman eds., 2006) ("[H]igher levels of trust make negotiation easier, while lower
levels of trust make negotiation more difficult.").
30 See Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT. J.
389, 391 (1991); Catherine H. Tinsley, Jack J. Cambria & Andrea Kupfer Schneider,
Reputations in Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 14, at 203,
207-09.
31 See Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration:
The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA
L. REv. 475, 482-83 (2005); Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 32, 36 (1987); Provis, supra note 17, at 147.
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble 2 (2008).
33 Id. at R.1.3.
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A lawyer should . .. take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal
in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to
press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a
lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in
determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. The lawyer's
duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive
tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process
with courtesy and respect.34
I believe that the general obligations set forth in the Preamble, Rule 1.3,
and Comment 1 oblige attorneys to seek terms beneficial to their own clients
when they negotiate on behalf of those persons.35 I think this is true whether
they are acting in an advocate capacity (e.g., representing a client in
litigation) or a nonadvocate capacity.
When acting in a nonadvocate capacity on behalf of a client, a lawyer
must, within the established constraints on professional behavior, attempt to
achieve the client's objectives, unless to do so would require that the lawyer
use unfair, unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful, means or that
the client achieve unfair, unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful,
ends, in which event the lawyer must not accept or continue the
representation." 36
"[P]rofessionalism means that a lawyer should. .. zealously and
competently use all lawful means to protect and advance the client's lawful
interests. . . "3 While legal representatives are not required to strive for
entirely one-sided agreements favoring their own clients, I do not think they
should forego terms that favor their own clients merely because they
personally desire to divide the issues in an egalitarian manner. "Any
34 Id. at cmt. 1; see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 126.
35 Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers'Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 83
(1985) (stating "[a] negotiator-agent is under a duty to act solely for the benefit of the
client-principal in all matters within the scope of the agency.").
36 See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, in
WHAT'S FAIR: ETHiCS FOR NEGOTIATORS 329, 333 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael
Wheeler eds., 2004).
37 Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41
EMORY L.J. 467, 470 (1992); see Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The
Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 3, 68-72
(1992); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1999).
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deviation from [the] current norm would jeopardize the coveted attorney-
client relationship and change the role of an attorney from that of an advocate
to one of 'social policeman."' 38 If their clients were to instruct them to divide
the terms equally, this would be fine. On the other hand, where clients wish
to obtain accords that advance their own interests, their attorneys should
work to accomplish that objective. While legal practitioners may not employ
unethical tactics-and need not resort to unprofessional or offensive
behavior-I believe they have an ethical duty to seek terms advantageous to
their own clients. 39
Negotiating attorneys have no obligation to act in a win-lose manner
designed to deprive opposing parties of fair terms simply to satisfy the
desires of vindictive clients. Nor do they ever have to act in an inappropriate
fashion. I believe that many proficient negotiators recognize that they should
behave professionally and strive for efficient agreements that maximize the
joint returns achieved by the different parties. This leaves opponents more
satisfied with what they received, and makes it more likely that they will
honor the accords achieved. Nonetheless, if negotiating attorneys can
professionally and ethically obtain more generous terms for their own clients,
I believe they are obliged to do so.
When I teach my graded negotiation class, I am amazed how diligently
students work to negotiate agreements that favor their own clients. I am also
pleased at how efficient most of their accords are, because I emphasize the
communitarian theory of bargaining efficiency and encourage students to
maximize opponent returns when this can be accomplished at minimal cost to
them. On rare occasions, students are so deceptive regarding their true
interests and settlement intentions that they achieve inefficient agreements
that place the persons on both sides below average. We then discuss what
they could have done to avoid such a situation. By the end of the term, the
students generally achieve highly efficient agreements that even
communitarians would respect-but they strive for accords that are more
favorable to their own clients than to the other side. In this regard, they do
contravene a basic tenet of communitarian bargaining.
38 Paul Rosenberger, Note & Comment, Laissez- "Fair": An Argument for the Status
Quo Ethical Constraints on Lawyers as Negotiators, 13 OHmo ST. J. oN DisP. RESOL. 611,
614 (1998). Rosenberger notes, "[a]ttorneys who naively believe that no deception is
proper during bargaining encounters place themselves and their clients at a distinct
disadvantage, because they permit their less candid opponents to obtain settlements and
'transcend the terms to which they are objectively entitled."' Id. at 626.
39 See Wendel, supra note 37, at 58-67.
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III. IMPACT OF NEGOTIATOR STYLES ON BARGAINING INTERACTIONS
Most negotiation books and negotiation teachers divide negotiators into
two stylistic groups: cooperative/problem-solvers and
competitive/adversarials. Cooperative/problem-solvers, who most closely
resemble communitarians, are epitomized by Getting to Yes 40 and Beyond
Winning.41 Such negotiators move psychologically toward their opponents,
and they strive to maximize the returns achieved by both sides. They begin
with realistic opening positions and seek reasonable and fair results. They
behave in a courteous and professional manner, and rely upon objective
criteria to enable them to reason with their opponents. They eschew
threatening behavior, and are open and trusting. They try to maximize the
disclosure of critical information to enable the participants to explore their
respective underlying interests in an effort to achieve Pareto optimal
agreements. They explore different alternatives that may allow the
participants to expand the overall pie through exchanges that simultaneously
advance the interests of both sides. For example, when money is an issue,
they consider the use of future payments or in-kind payments that would
effectively satisfy the underlying interests of the party seeking cash.
The competitive/adversarial style is epitomized by books like Start With
No42 and Secrets of Power Negotiating.43 Such negotiators move
psychologically against their opponents, and they work to maximize their
own side's returns. They begin their interactions with unreasonable opening
positions and seek extreme results favoring their own side. They often
behave in an adversarial and competitive manner. They focus primarily on
their own positions and often resort to threats. They are closed, untrusting,
and manipulative. They minimize the disclosure of their own information,
and they try to achieve their own goals while making minimal concessions to
the other side.
Competitive/adversarial negotiators often engage in disingenuous game-
playing. They conceal negative information and overstate their positive
information. In their effort to advance their own interests, they may ignore
alternative formulations that might benefit their opponents if those options do
40 FISHER & URY, supra note 12.
41 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCorT R. PEPPET & ANDREWS S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); see also
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984).
4 2 JIM CAMP, START WITH No: THE NEGOTIATION TOOLS THAT PROS DON'T WANT
You To KNOW (2002).
43 ROGER DAWSON, SECRETS OF POWER NEGOTIATING (2d ed. 1999).
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not advance their own interests. Their primary objective is the advancement
of their own situations, and they care little about the results achieved by their
opponents.
The first major empirical study of lawyer negotiator styles was
conducted in 1976 by Gerald Williams in Phoenix." Williams asked
attorneys to classify lawyers with whom they had recently interacted. Sixty-
five percent of practitioners were characterized as cooperative/problem-
solvers, twenty-four percent as competitive/adversarial, and eleven percent
were not placed in either category.45 He then asked his respondents to
indicate which of these individuals were effective negotiators, average
negotiators, and ineffective negotiators. Fifty-nine percent of
cooperative/problem-solvers were rated effective, thirty-eight percent were
rated average, and three percent were rated ineffective. 46 Only twenty-five
percent of competitive/adversarials were rated effective, forty-two percent
were rated average, and thirty-three percent were rated ineffective. 47
In 1999, Andrea Schneider replicated the Williams study with attorneys
in Milwaukee and Chicago. 48 She found that sixty-four percent of attorneys
were described by their peers as cooperative/problem-solvers, while thirty-
six percent were considered competitive/adversarial. 49 Fifty-four percent of
cooperative/problem-solvers were rated effective, versus only nine percent of
competitive/adversarials, while only four percent of cooperative/problem-
solvers were rated ineffective compared to fifty-three percent of
competitive/adversarials.50
When the Williams and Schneider studies are compared, it is interesting
to note two significant changes. While the proportion of effective
cooperative/problem-solvers declined slightly from the 1976 study to the
1999 study, from fifty-nine percent to fifty-four percent, the proportion of
effective competitive/adversarials dropped from twenty-five percent to nine
percent. 51 At the other extreme, while the proportion of ineffective
cooperative/problem-solvers increased slightly from 1976 to 1999, from
4 GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983).
45 Id. at 19.
46 Id. at 19.
47 GERALD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES B. CRAVER, LEGAL NEGOTIATING 14-16
(2007).
48 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on
the Effectiveness ofNegotiation Style, 7 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 143 (2002).
49 Id. at 163.
50 Id. at 167.
5 1 Id.
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three percent to four percent, the proportion of ineffective
competitive/adversarials rose from thirty-three percent to fifty-three
percent.52
The empirical findings by Williams and Schneider seem to support the
communitarian claim that effective negotiators generally employ a
cooperative/problem-solving style which encourages complete openness and
a desire to maximize the joint returns achieved. A closer examination of their
findings, however, suggests that many wolves may be disguised as sheep.
Both Williams and Schneider asked the effective negotiators from both
groups to list their major goals. The number one objective for effective
competitive/adversarials was predictably to maximize their own returns. 53
This factor is the quintessential characteristic of competitive negotiators.
Nonetheless, when effective cooperative/problem-solvers listed their primary
goals, they indicated that maximizing their own returns was their second
objective-just behind their desire to maintain ethical standards. 54 A closer
examination of these factors has caused Williams and me to recognize the
existence of a hybrid stylistic category between cooperative/problem-solving
and competitive/adversarial, which combines the optimal traits of both.
"Competitive/problem-solvers" are negotiators who seek competitive
objectives-the maximizing of their own returns-but do so in a non-
adversarial manner. They also strive to maximize opponent returns once they
have achieved their own primary goals.55 These persons are more open than
competitive/adversarials, but less forthcoming than true
cooperative/problem-solvers. They indicate which items they really hope to
obtain, recognizing that such disclosures are critical if the parties hope to
achieve efficient agreements, 56 but they over- and under-state true client
values for strategic purposes. When competitive/problem-solvers interact
with na'ive cooperative/problem-solvers, they try to exploit their opponents'
openness.57 They work to create value in the Getting to Yes tradition, but
then employ disingenuous tactics to claim more of the bargaining surplus
than they give to their opponents.58 Unsuspecting lawyers do not appreciate
52 Id. at 189.
53 See WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 23; Schneider, supra note 48, at 179.
54 See WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 20; Schneider, supra note 48, at 170.
55 See WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 47, at 64-65.
56 See Alan Strudler, On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation, 5 BuS. ETHIcs Q.
805, 814 (1995).
57 See Steven Hartwell, Understanding and Dealing with Deception in Legal
Negotiation, 6 OHIo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 171, 173-75, 185-86 (1991).
58 Wetlaufer suggests:
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the manipulative nature of competitive/problem-solvers. They thus classify
these adroit negotiators as cooperative/problem-solvers. They think these
persons are being completely open and forthright, when they are not being so
candid. They thus reciprocate the seeming openness of such bargainers,
without realizing that their openness is not being entirely reciprocated.s9
They think that these individuals are trying to achieve "win-win" results,
when they are actually seeking "WIN-win" distributions.60
Keith Allred found this approach effective when he conducted empirical
studies of factors associated with proficient negotiators. He explored the
degree to which skilled negotiators employ "strategic practices" designed to
enable them to claim more value for themselves and "integrating and
accommodating practices" designed to maximize the joint returns achieved.
He found that the most capable negotiators were considered by opponents to
use primarily "integrating and accommodating practices," even though these
interactors admitted that they employed "strategic practices" to advance their
own interests. 61
"Haggling permits bargainers to learn about, adjust to, and accommodate
the interests of other bargainers. It permits them to change minds, weaken
convictions, make trades, call attention to facts not fully considered, revive
considerations dismissed prematurely, and express the nature of their
interests and the intensity of their resolve." 62
[E]ven within the range of circumstances in which there are significant opportunities
for integrative bargaining, the bargainer must almost always engage in distributive
bargaining as well. Therefore, it is in the bargainer's self-interest not just to adopt
the tactics of openness and truth telling that are said to be appropriate to integrative
bargaining, but somehow also to adopt the tactics of truth-hiding and dissimulation
that are said to be appropriate to distributive bargaining.
Wetlaufer, supra note 18, at 390-91; see Condlin, supra note 16, at 65-66; Friedman &
Shapiro, supra note 19, at 247-50; Lowenthal, supra note 19, at 82.
59 See Tinsley, Cambria & Schneider, supra note 30, at 207-08 (indicating how
much more open cooperative/problem-solvers are when they think they are interacting
with other cooperative/problem-solvers).
6 0 See RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK A. JANKOWsKI, THE POWER OF NICE: How To
NEGOTIATE So EVERYONE WINS-ESPECIALLY You! 5 (Rev. ed. 2001).
61 Keith G. Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework for
Managing the Dilemma Between Creating and Claiming Value, 16 NEGOT. J. 387, 394-
95 (2000).
62 Robert J. Condlin, "Every Day and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and
Meta, " or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining
Theory), 23 OIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 231, 268 (2008).
315
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The findings of Williams and Schneider strongly suggest that a number
of lawyers who agree to abide by collaborative or cooperative law
communitarian standards of conduct are somewhat disingenuous. They do
not begin with the more extreme positions employed by
competitive/adversarials, but they do not begin with the truly reasonable
positions articulated by real cooperative/problem-solvers. They instead begin
with somewhat over-stated demands or under-stated offers. They do
acknowledge their real objectives, but under and over-state the degree to
which they desire those items. They are quite efficient at creating value, as
they get the important terms on the bargaining table. On the other hand, they
subtly employ manipulative techniques designed to allow them to claim more
than their fair share of the joint value that has been discovered. 63
Why are competitive/problem-solvers able to achieve their one-sided
objectives without being obvious to opposing attorneys? They intuitively
recognize the fact that negotiators usually judge their satisfaction with
bargaining results more by the degree to which they think the process was
fair and respectful than by the objective value to the terms they actually
obtained.M Competitive/problem-solvers are pleasant and respectful
negotiators. They eschew openly competitive tactics, and behave as if they
are cooperative/problem-solvers. Their opponents are so pleased by the way
these individuals behave and the way in which the negotiation process
develops that they over-value the objective value of the results they actually
obtain.
It is easy to understand why communitarians believe that two-thirds of
legal negotiators employ the cooperative/problem-solving style they respect,
even though many of the negotiators placed in this category actually employ
the competitive/problem-solving style. These persons seem to be entirely
open and interested in the generation of fair and efficient agreements that
maximize the joint returns achieved by the parties. They always behave in a
respectful and professional manner. They do not seem to over- or under-state
their true needs, nor do they appear to misrepresent their actual settlement
intentions. When they are successful, their opponents have no idea how
adroitly these proficient bargainers have used subtly manipulative tactics to
advance their own interests.
63 See Wetlaufer, supra note 19, at 1228-29.
6 See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in
Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 473 (2008); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE
NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 14, at 165, 170-71.
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IV. OVERT MISREPRESENTATIONS, PARTIAL DISCLOSURES,
NONDISCLOSURES, AND INAPPROPRIATE ACCESS TO OPPONENT
INFORMATION
When I teach negotiating skills to students and practicing lawyers, I often
indicate that I have never participated in a legal negotiation-as an advocate
or mediator-where both sides did not lie, yet I have encountered almost no
attorneys I thought were dishonest.65 This seeming contradiction is based
upon the fact that they have all engaged in puffing and embellishment. They
have over- and under-stated client values, and misstated their true settlement
intentions, but have almost never misrepresented other factual or legal issues
of a material nature.
In certain bargaining situations, we ... play ... mutually deceptive
roles: .. . [F]alse claims are a convention; . .. If buyers and sellers bargain
knowingly and voluntarily, one would be hard put to regard as misleading
their exaggerations, false claims to have given their last bid, or words of
feigned loss of interest. Both parties have then consented to the rules of the
game. 66
As noted earlier, while Rule 4.1 prohibits the knowing misrepresentation
of material fact or law, Comment 2 expressly recognizes that statements
regarding client values and settlement intentions made during bargaining
interactions do not concern material fact.67 It is thus ethical for negotiating
attorneys to deliberately misrepresent such matters. They may do this
overtly, partially, or through the nondisclosure of information.
A. Overt Misrepresentations
Assume that two attorneys are negotiating a marital dissolution for their
respective clients. May one lawyer ethically indicate that her client desires
joint custody of the young children, even though her client does not, hoping
to use this issue to obtain other terms she actually desires? Since this matter
65 See Norton, supra note 24, at 506 ("Bargaining is a unique process in which the
parties engage in stylized strategic behavior and use practices such as bluffing, puffing,
and withholding information as a matter of course."); Scott R. Peppet, Mindfulness in the
Law and ADR: Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect
Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83, 91-92 (2002).
66 SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 130-31
(1978).
67 See supra notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text.
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concerns client values, the misrepresentation does not involve material fact.
Suppose the lawyer knows that her client has $50,000 in a secret bank
account. Could she deny the existence of that account or understate the actual
amount in it? These misrepresentations would clearly pertain to material
facts and would thus contravene Rule 4.1. Such misstatements of material
fact could also expose the client to a suit for fraud, based upon the material
misrepresentation that was reasonably relied upon by the other spouse to his
or her detriment.
Similar factual issues could easily arise in a personal injury case. May a
plaintiff attorney embellish the discomfort associated with a sprained ankle
suffered by the claimant due to the defendant's negligence? Clearly yes, so
long as the statements are not entirely beyond the bounds of anything a
reasonable person would characterize as mere puffing. Could the plaintiffs
attorney falsely state that the claimant's ankle is broken? Not without
contravening Rule 4.1 and exposing his client to an action for fraud, since
this would involve a misrepresentation of material fact. Suppose a plaintiffs
ankle has almost healed, and that person is skiing down the slopes in
Colorado. Could the claimant attorney indicate that his client is only able to
move with the assistance of crutches and special attachments to the feet?
Such factual statements would certainly be considered improper and
fraudulent, since they go well beyond puffing and are contrary to the real
circumstances.
Suppose an attorney is negotiating the sale of a business for a client. The
owner of the firm would like to obtain $50 million, but would seriously
consider offers in the $40 to $45 million range. Could the business lawyer
tell a prospective buyer that her client would not accept anything less than
$55 million? The answer is clearly yes, since this statement concerns client
settlement intentions that do not constitute material information within the
meaning of Rule 4.1.68 Could she state that other parties will undoubtedly be
interested in her client's firm, even if no one else has yet contacted her client
about a possible purchase? Most lawyers would consider such a statement to
be mere puffing and permissible under acceptable negotiation ethical
standards, even though such positional misstatements would be likely to help
68 See PSI Energy, Inc. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 17 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1994)
("An obligation to negotiate 'in good faith' nixes trickery and certain forms of
obduracy, . . .but it does not require one side in negotiations to reveal its bargaining
strategy or reservation price. . . ."); Russell Korobkin, Michael L. Moffitt & Nancy A.
Welsh, The Law ofBargaining, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 14, at 183,
184.
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the speaker obtain an advantage at the bargaining table.69 It would similarly
be acceptable to most persons for the seller's representative to talk generally
about the golden future of the business, even if she somewhat overstated the
actual situation, since such embellishments are normally not considered to
concern statements of material fact.70
If the firm attorney obtains a $42 million offer from one party, may she
indicate that her side has an offer from a different party when they have not
received any such offer? When I have discussed this question with corporate
counsel at continuing legal education programs, the vast majority suggest
that such a misstatement would not be appropriate. It is not mere puffery, but
concerns an issue of material fact-whether another party has made a
definitive offer to purchase the business in question. I agree with this
viewpoint. While it is almost certainly acceptable to indicate that other
parties would have an interest in the firm, with such a general statement
constituting mere puffery, it is inappropriate for the lawyer to make a
knowingly false statement regarding the existence of another bidder.
Suppose the seller receives an offer of $45 million from another party.
Could the firm attorney tell the $42 million bidder that they have received a
$50 million offer? I believe that such a deliberate misrepresentation would
both contravene Rule 4.1 and expose her client to a suit for fraud based on
the clearly material nature of this misrepresentation. 71 On the other hand, she
69 See Roy J. Lewicki & Robert J. Robinson, Ethical and Unethical Bargaining
Tactics: An Empirical Study, 17 J. Bus. ETHics 665, 666-67 (1998); Alan Strudler,
Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1529, 1540-41 (1998).
70 See, e.g., Vaughn v. Gen. Foods Corp., 797 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir. 1986); Royal Bus.
Mach. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 42 (7th Cir. 1980); Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons
Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1918).
It is common knowledge and may always be assumed that any seller will express a
favorable opinion concerning what he has to sell; and when he praises it in general
terms, without specific content or reference to facts, buyers are expected to and do
understand that they are not entitled to rely literally upon the words.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 542 cmt. e (2009). While statements of opinion do
not usually give rise to actionable fraud, more specific statements upon which listeners
may reasonably rely may be actionable. See, e.g., James v. Lifeline Mobile Medics, 792
N.E.2d 461 (Ill. App. 2003) (finding misrepresentation regarding defendant's pending
bankruptcy during settlement negotiations actionable, since such a specific statement
involved more than mere statement of opinion).
71 See Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 1952)
(holding that actionable fraud for real estate owner to tell lessee he had an offer from a
third party for an exaggerated rental amount in an effort to induce the lessee to enter into
a new lease at an unwarranted rental rate). See generally Anne M. Burr, Ethics in
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could probably state that they have received another offer and suggest to the
$42 million bidder that it will cost $50 million to purchase the business.
When this statement is made, the lawyer is not disclosing the actual value of
the other offer. She is truthfully indicating that they have received another
offer, and engaging in mere puffery when she indicates that it will take $50
million to purchase her client's firm. Since the latter point clearly concerns
the settlement intention of her client, it is nonmaterial information within the
meaning of the Comment 2 exclusion. What could she ethically say if the
other party directly asks her if they have received a $50 million offer from
the other party? She may not answer this inquiry affirmatively, because they
have not received such an offer, and such a misrepresentation would concern
material fact. She could, however, indicate that such information is
confidential and reiterate that it will take $50 million to purchase her client's
business.
Does it matter whether attorney misrepresentations regarding client
values and settlement intentions are conveyed to lawyers representing other
clients, as opposed to judicial mediators or private mediators? In 1993, the
American Bar Association indicated that knowing misrepresentations
regarding client values and settlement intentions made to judicial mediators
would be impermissible, based upon the view that the Comment 2 exception
only applies to bargaining interactions with opposing counsel. 72 Since such
misstatements to judicial officials would not be confined to adversarial
interactions, they would contravene Rule 4.1.
In 2006, the American Bar Association had to decide whether the logic
of Formal Opinion 93-370 barred misrepresentations regarding client values
and settlement intentions to nonjudicial mediators.73 If it followed the
reasoning of its 1993 opinion, it would have had to decide that lawyers could
not misstate client values and settlement intentions to any neutral parties, but
it felt uncomfortable with such an expansive prohibition. As a result, it
decided to limit the coverage of the prior opinion to judicial offers, and it
held that such conversations with judicial facilitators are governed by Model
Rule 3.3(a)(1), 74 which forbids lawyers from knowingly making false
statements of material fact to tribunals.75 It then indicated that Comment 2 to
Negotiation: Does Getting to Yes Require Candor?, 56-JUL DIsP. RESOL. J. 8, 10-11
(2001); Perschbacher, supra note 35, at 90, 127-29; G. Richard Shell, Bargaining with
the Devil Without Losing Your Soul, in WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra
note 36, at 58-65.
72 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 (1993).
73 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (1) (2008).
75 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
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Rule 4.1 would apply to communications between advocates and nonjudicial
mediators, allowing parties to engage in traditional puffing and
embellishment in such settings. 76 I agree with this ruling, since when I
function as a nonjudicial mediator, the parties regularly misrepresent their
client values and settlement intentions during both our joint and separate
caucus sessions.
B. Misleading Partial Disclosures
Negotiators often use selective disclosures to enhance their positions.
They discuss the legal doctrines and factual information beneficial to their
situations and withhold the circumstances that are not helpful. In most
instances, these selective disclosures are expected by opponents and are
considered an inherent aspect of bargaining interactions. When attorneys
emphasize their strengths, opposing counsel must work to ascertain their
hidden weaknesses. Probing questions can be effectively employed to
explore areas not being discussed.
There are times when the partial disclosure of information is improper
because of legal obligations requiring full disclosure. For example, securities
regulations generally require stock and bond sellers to disclose certain
information to prospective purchasers. The housing laws in many states
require sellers to disclose serious defects even if they are not asked about
such circumstances. When such affirmative obligations are imposed,
attorneys are obliged to disclose the requisite information or expose their
clients to liability.
Under some circumstances, partial statements may mislead opposing
counsel as effectively as overt misrepresentations. For example, the plaintiff
in Spaulding v. Zimmerman77 sustained cracked ribs and fractured clavicles
in an automobile accident. After the ribs and clavicles had healed, the
defense attorney had the plaintiff examined by his own medical expert who
found an aorta aneurysm that neither the claimant nor his attorney knew
about. Although the defense lawyer was under no ethical obligation to
voluntarily disclose the existence of the aneurysm and could ignore questions
regarding the independent medical examiner's findings, he could certainly
not overtly misrepresent the doctor's diagnosis. Would it be ethical for the
defense counsel to respond to plaintiff attorney questions regarding this
matter by stating that "the ribs and the clavicles have healed?" Would such a
partial disclosure constitute a deliberate misrepresentation of material fact
76 Idn
77 Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
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due to the fact the defendant's lawyer realized that the claimant's attorney
would interpret such a statement as an indication that everything had healed?
Comment I to Rule 4.1 expressly addresses this issue when it indicates that
"[m]isrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading
statements . .. that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements."78
Although defense counsel could most likely say nothing about the aneurysm,
he could not provide a statement that, while true, is clearly misleading to the
claimant's attorney. 79 Thus, lawyers must forego statements that are facially
true, but which they know are misleading to listeners who do not appreciate
the inherent deception involved.
C. Nondisclosure of Information
Although Model Rule 4.1 requires attorneys to be truthful when they
make representations concerning material law or fact, Comment 1 indicates
that lawyers have "no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of
relevant facts."80 In the absence of special relations imposing fiduciary
relationships or express contractual or statutory duties, practitioners are
normally not obligated to divulge relevant legal or factual information to
their opponents.8 1 This doctrine is premised upon the duty imposed upon
representatives to conduct their own legal research and factual investigations.
Under our adversary system, lawyers do not have the right to expect their
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2008). See generally Donald C.
Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52
STAN. L. REv. 87 (1999).
79 It is interesting to note that the American Bar Association recently amended
Model Rule 1.6, governing the voluntary disclosure of confidential client information, to
permit-but not require-disclosure of the type of information involved in the Spaulding
case where the lawyer reasonably believes that such disclosure is "necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2008).
80 Id. at R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
81 See Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of
Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65 (1994); Thomas F.
Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 99, 116 (1982-83); Robert
McKay, Ethical Considerations in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 ARB. J. 15, 19
(1990); Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations:
Should There Be a Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 179, 182 (2004); see
also Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REv.
337 (1997).
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opponents to assist them in this regard. 82 It is only when cases reach tribunals
that Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) imposes an affirmative obligation on advocates "to
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel." 83 It is interesting to note that no such duty is
imposed upon litigants by Rule 3.3(a)(2) with respect to pertinent factual
circumstances that may favor the other side which have not been discovered
by opposing counsel.
Stare v. Tate84 involved divorce negotiations designed to divide the
spouses' community property on an equal basis. When valuing certain
property, Ms. Stare's attorney made a mathematical error that understated the
actual value by $100,000. Although Mr. Tate and his lawyer were aware of
this miscalculation, they said nothing and agreed to settlement terms that
deprived Ms. Stare of $50,000. The court reformed the property settlement to
provide Ms. Stare with the additional $50,000 she deserved because Mr. Tate
and his attorney were fully aware of Ms. Stare's miscalculation and sought to
take advantage of it.8 5
82 See Hazard, supra note 23, at 185-86. In ABA Formal Opinion 06-439, while
expressly addressing the Rule 3.3(a)(1) duty of legal advocates to be entirely truthful
when speaking with judicial mediators, the ABA Committee inexplicably included the
following dicta concerning a lawyer's obligation under Rule 4.1:
[E]ven though a client's Board of Directors has authorized a higher settlement
figure, a lawyer may state in a negotiation that the client does not wish to settle for
more than 450. However, it would not be permissible for the lawyer to state that the
Board of Directors has formally disapproved any settlement in excess of $50, when
authority had in fact been granted to settle for a higher sum.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). Perhaps the
ABA Committee feels that an attorney cannot directly misrepresent what the Board of
Directors has formally done. Since this statement effectively concerns the Board of
Directors' settlement intentions, it should not be considered "material information" as
unequivocally acknowledged in Comment 2 to Rule 4.1. Nevertheless, if a lawyer were to
feel uncomfortable making such a specific statement concerning Board of Directors
ations, he or she could certainly state that the firm "will not pay" more than $50. This
statement would pertain directly to the client's settlement intentions. It would be careless
for a legal advocate to indicate that the firm "does not wish to settle for more than $50,"
since the verbal leak "does not wish" would clearly signal to a discerning adversary that
the client is perfectly willing to go above that figure.
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2008).
84 Stare v. Tate, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
85 Id. at 269.
323
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Stare v. Tate should be compared with Brown v. County of Genesee,86
which concerned a county attorney who was negotiating the resolution of a
Rehabilitation Act claim with the lawyer representing a diabetic employee.
The claimant's attorney made a proposal to place the employee on a certain
salary level, which they believed to be the highest she could attain; however,
she could actually have been placed at a higher level. The court found that
the county attorney had no legal or ethical duty to correct the erroneous
belief in this regard, because the mistake by the claimant and her counsel was
due to their failure to examine or understand the public records available to
everyone, and her counsel could have requested this information. Thus, the
court refused to modify the claimant's settlement agreement to allow her to
receive the higher salary because the mistaken belief was unilateral, rather
than mutual. Should the county attorney, as a public official, have been under
an affirmative duty to correct the claimant's obvious misunderstanding, or
should the conventional rule of caveat emptor applicable to private sector
negotiators have been controlling? May the Brown determination be
distinguished from the holding in Stare v. Tate based upon the fact Stare
involved a wholly private issue, whereas Brown involved a public record that
anyone could have checked?
Suppose attorneys representing a severely injured plaintiff learn during
the critical stages of settlement discussions that their client has died due to
factors unrelated to the underlying law suit. Would they be under an ethical
duty to disclose this fact to defense counsel who is clearly assuming
continuing pain and medical care for the plaintiff? In Virzi v. Grand Trunk
Warehouse & Cold Storage,87 the court held that the claimant's counsel had
a clear duty to disclose the death of his client to both the court and to
opposing counsel prior to the negotiation of a settlement agreement.
Plaintiffs counsel was obliged to notify defense attorneys of the plaintiffs
demise before any agreement was concluded that affected the claimant's
estate because the death of the claimant would presumably have necessitated
the substitution of plaintiffs estate executor.88 Furthermore, assuming
plaintiffs attorneys had provided defense counsel with answers to
86 Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989).
87 Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D.
Mich. 1983).
88 Cf Kentucky Bar Ass'n. v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997) (sustaining
public reprimand for plaintiff attorney who failed to notify defense counsel that plaintiff
had died during their settlement negotiations). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397 (1995) (indicating that lawyer's failure to disclose the
death of his client was tantamount to making a false statement of material fact in
violation of Model Rule 4.1).
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interrogatories concerning the medical condition of their client during the
discovery process, they would have been under a duty to correct these
answers once the claimant's condition had become fatal.89
Suppose the party possessing the relevant medical information regarding
a plaintiff is not the plaintiffs attorney, but rather the defense counsel. This
issue was directly raised in Spaulding v. Zimmerman,90 which was mentioned
previously. Spaulding's ribs and clavicles, which had been fractured in an
automobile accident, had healed and he seemed to be well on the road to
recovery. The physician who conducted an independent medical examination
for the defense attorneys discovered an aneurysm on Spaulding's aorta.
Defense counsel was never asked by plaintiff counsel about the results of this
examination, and he did not volunteer any information regarding the
physician's findings. 91
A settlement agreement was achieved, which had to be approved by the
trial judge because David Spaulding was a minor. After the case was settled,
Spaulding's condition was discovered during a military induction physical,
and the aneurysm was surgically repaired. He discovered that the defense
counsel was aware of this condition, and he moved to set aside the prior
settlement agreement. The trial judge vacated the agreement, and the case
was appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Despite the fact that most
people would undoubtedly regard an affirmative duty to disclose the critical
medical information to be the morally appropriate approach, 92 the Minnesota
Supreme Court correctly determined that the defense attorneys were under no
ethical duty to volunteer the discovered aneurysm to plaintiffs counsel.93 In
fact, without client consent, the confidentiality preservation obligation then
imposed by Model Rule 1.6 precluded voluntary disclosure by defense
89 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) provides that
[a] party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response
is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective
information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the
discovery process or in writing.
90 Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
91 Id. at 708-09.
92 These persons would probably expect the examining physician to be under a
similar duty to disclose the aneurysm pursuant to the Hippocratic Oath. Even though the
doctor was not a treating physician, but only an expert witness retained by the defense
counsel, their obligation to do no harm should oblige him to disclose such a life-
threatening condition even if he is not treating the person being examined.
93 Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709.
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counsel under these circumstances. Comment 5 expressly stated that "[t]he
confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the
representation, whatever its source." 94
The Spaulding court circumvented the Rule 1.6 prohibition by holding
that as officers of the court, defense counsel had an affirmative duty under
Rule 3.3(a)(1) 95 to disclose the newly discovered medical information to the
trial judge. prior to his approval of the settlement agreement. 96 Had Spaulding
not been a minor, the court may have been obliged to enforce the original
accord because of the absence of any trial court involvement in the
settlement process.
If courts are unwilling to impose affirmative disclosure obligations on
advocates who possess such critical information pertaining to opposing
clients, they should sustain the resulting settlement agreements despite the
lack of disclosure. This would at least permit defense lawyers to divulge the
crucial information as soon as the settlement terms have been satisfied. By
voiding such agreements after plaintiffs learn of the withheld information,
judges effectively require defense counsel to remain silent even after lawsuits
have been finally resolved.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers97 protects
defense attorneys who divulge medical information in Spaulding-type
situations. Section 66 indicates that attorneys who voluntarily disclose
information concerning a condition posing a reasonably certain risk of death
or serious bodily injury to opposing counsel should not be found in violation
of Rule 1.6, nor be subject to legal malpractice liability to their own clients.98
In 2003, the ABA House of Delegates amended Model Rule 1.6 to comport
with § 66 of the Restatement. Rule 1.6(b)(1) now permits-but does not
require-attorneys to disclose otherwise confidential information when
necessary "to prevent reasonably certain.death or serious bodily harm." 99
94 THOMAs D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2004 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 180-81 (2004) (quoting comment 5). The same language
is now found in Comment 3, but its impact has been modified by the change in Rule 1.6
discussed below. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2008).
95 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2008).
96 Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 1962).
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
9 8 See id. § 66.
99 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008); see ABA Amends Ethics
Rules on Confidentiality, Corporate Clients to Allow More Disclosures, 72 U.S. L. WK.
2091 (2003).
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Suppose plaintiff or defense counsel are on the verge of a lawsuit
settlement based upon a line of state supreme court cases favoring their
client. The morning of the day they are scheduled to finalize their
transaction, the state supreme court issues an opinion overturning the prior
beneficial decisions and indicating that the new rule applies to all pending
cases. Would knowledgeable attorneys whose position has been completely
undermined by these legal changes be obligated to inform their unsuspecting
opponents about this critical development before the settlement agreement is
executed? Most practitioners I ask respond in the negative based on their
belief that legal counsel are obliged to conduct their own legal research. They
could not, however, continue to cite the decisions that have been overruled
because such legal misstatements would contravene Rule 4.1.
Suppose that settlement talks have been continuing while a defense
motion for summary judgment has been pending before the trial court. One
morning, the claimant attorney receives a court order in the mail indicating
that the defendant's motion for summary judgment had been granted. The
plaintiffs lawyer telephones the defense counsel and realizes that she has not
yet received notice of her summary judgment victory. Could plaintiffs
counsel try to settle the case immediately without disclosing this fact? No
Model Rule appears to answer this question, and a few attorneys have told
me that they would not hesitate to seek a final accord without disclosure.
Most lawyers, however, believe that as officers of the court they would be
under an affirmative duty to notify defense counsel of the court's
communication since such a notice is expected to reach both sides
simultaneously. A number of judges I have asked have unanimously agreed
with the latter view, suggesting that they would vacate any settlement
achieved by plaintiff's counsel without disclosure.
D. Deception by Disingenuous Conduct
Suppose two parties are negotiating and one provides the other with a
written proposal. The recipient of the proposal looks disappointed, tears up
the written document, and walks out of the room. If the terms set forth in the
proposal are actually within the settlement range of the recipient, would that
person's actions be unethical since they were designed to mislead the
offeror? Most legal practitioners would answer in the negative, on the ground
the misleading demonstrative behavior concerns their underlying settlement
intentions, which are considered nonmaterial fact information under
Comment 2 to Rule 4.1. Such threats or bluffs are part of many bargaining
interactions. They may hinder effective integrative negotiations, but they
may be effectively employed by individuals seeking to claim value for
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themselves. 00 Only communitarian-oriented theorists who believe that no
deceitful conduct should be permitted during bargaining interactions would
be likely to consider such actions improper. 01
E. Unintended Access to Confidential Opponent Information
When attorneys provide documents pursuant to discovery requests or
send negotiation proposals to opposing counsel, they occasionally include
confidential or privileged client documents they did not intend to include.
What should opposing counsel do when they realize that they have received
documents they were not supposed to see? Model Rule 4.4(b) states that "[a]
lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's
client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender."1 02
Before or after receiving attorneys notify opposing counsel of their
receipt of documents not intended for their viewing, may they examine those
papers? Neither Rule 4.4(b) nor the Comments following that Rule answer
this question. "Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such
as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of
these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document
has been waived." 03
Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example,
when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was
inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by
applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document
is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. 104
I do not believe that the ABA should provide such ambiguous and
unhelpful guidance. In ABA Formal Opinion 92-368, the ABA indicated that
attorneys who receive confidential or privileged materials from opposing
counsel that appear to have been sent to them inadvertently should refrain
100 See generally Debra L. Shapiro & Robert J. Bies, Threats, Bluffs, and
Disclaimers in Negotiations, 60 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES
14 (1994).
101 See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 79-81 (1994).
102 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008).
103 Id at cmt. 2.
104 Id. at cmt. 3.
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from examining those materials.105 They were directed to notify opposing
counsel of the circumstances and abide by the instructions provided by those
persons. Current Rule 4.4(b) continues to require attorneys who obtain
confidential or privileged information that seems to have been inadvertently
sent by opposing counsel to notify those lawyers, but the receiving attorneys
are no longer obliged to refrain from examining those documents, nor must
they abide by the instructions they receive from the sending lawyers.
I believe that the modified Rule 4.4(b) pessimistically assumes that most
legal representatives are dishonorable persons who will not voluntarily
refrain from taking advantage of erroneous disclosures of confidential or
privileged information by opposing attorneys. Thus, it inexplicably allows
recipients of mistakenly sent information to peruse those materials. I think
that most attorneys are honest persons who would not take undue advantage
of such errors by other lawyers. As soon as it becomes clear that they have
received documents not intended for their viewing, the vast majority would
be willing to refrain from any further examination of those materials. They
would immediately notify opposing counsel of their apparent mistake and
abide by the instructions they receive from those individuals. The recipients
might be told to return the documents unread, or to destroy them without
further examination. The fact that a few attorneys would take undue
advantage of such errors by opposing counsel should not dictate the
obligations that should be imposed on honorable lawyers.
A somewhat related issue arises with respect to e-mail communications
exchanged by legal representatives. When people send Word or WordPerfect
files, the electronic files contain metadata which recipients can access. This
allows the recipients of such electronic files to ascertain every change made
in those files since their creation. Attorneys drafting demand letters or other
position statements may make numerous modifications which demonstrate
the degree to which they have altered their positions. For example, plaintiff s
attorneys may increase or decrease the amount of money they are claiming
for their clients, or defense lawyers may inadvertently disclose weaknesses in
their positions. When I talk to legal practitioners about the ability of others to
mine the metadata contained in the electronic files they send, the
overwhelming majority are shocked. They have no idea what I am talking
about.
Legal representatives who receive electronic files from other attorneys
should recognize the fact that most of the senders are unaware of this
metadata contained in those files. If they were aware of these metadata, they
would take precautions to eliminate them. The senders expect the recipients
105 ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
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to open the files and see exactly what the senders see on their computer
monitors or on the printed versions of those files. They do not expect the file
recipients to ascertain the changes they have made in those files. In ABA
Formal Opinion 06-442, the ABA ignored this fact and indicated that
lawyers have no ethical obligation to refrain from mining and using the
metadata embedded in electronic files received from other attorneys.106
Although Comment 2 to Rule 4.4 indicates that the term "'document'
includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being
read or put into readable form," 0 7 the most recipients of such files must do is
notify the senders of their mistake. They do not have to refrain from mining
the metadata, nor do they have to abide by any instructions they may receive
from the transmitting attorneys. 0 8
The New York Bar, 109 the Alabama Bar,llo and the Maine Bar' have
indicated that such mining of metadata in electronic files contravenes Model
Rule 8.4, which states that it constitutes "professional misconduct" for a
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation [or] . . . that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."112 The Alabama Bar acknowledged that the "mining of metadata
constitutes a knowing and deliberate attempt by the recipient attorney to
acquire confidential and privileged information in order to obtain an unfair
advantage against an opposing party." 1 3
I agree with the New York, Alabama, and Maine Bar Associations.
Attorneys who receive electronic files should only be permitted to open those
files to see what the sending lawyers intended them to see. It should be
entirely unethical for them to mine the metadata they know the senders did
not realize they had included in their electronic files. The recipients should
not have to notify the senders of their inadvertent inclusion of this metadata,
because they should not be looking for this metadata.
All state bar associations should advise attorneys practicing in their
jurisdictions about the presence of metadata in electronic files. The New
106 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
107 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2008).
108 A similar conclusion was reached by the Maryland Bar Ethics Committee, but
the Maryland Committee emphasized the fact that the Maryland Bar has not adopted
Model Rule 4.4(b). Md. Bar Ethics Op. 2007-09.
109 N.Y. State Bar Ethics Op. 749 (2001).
110 Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm. Op. 2007-02 (2007).
Ill Me. Bd. of Bar Overseers Professional Ethics Comm. Op. 196 (2008).
112 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2008).
113 Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm. Op. 2007-02 (2007).
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York Bar, 114 the Alabama Bar, 15 and the Maine Barl 16 have concluded that
attorneys have an ethical obligation under the confidentiality duty imposed
by Model Rule 1.6 to use "reasonable care" when transmitting electronic
documents to prevent the inclusion of metadata containing confidential or
privileged client information. There are several ways lawyers sending
electronic files can preclude the unintended transmission of such metadata.
They can use a scrubbing software program designed to eliminate the
metadata from files before they are sent to opposing counsel. They can
alternatively create new files and then insert the existing files into the newly
created files. This insertion option eliminates the metadata contained in the
existing files that were inserted into the newly created files. At a minimum,
they should only transmit PDF files which minimize the metadata contained
in them.
V. INAPPROPRIATE TACTICS AND UNCONSCIONABLE AGREEMENTS
In recent years, an increasing number of legal representatives-
especially in larger urban areas-have decided to employ offensive
negotiation tactics to advance client interests. They behave in a rude,
sarcastic, or nasty manner. I have even noticed an increase in such behavior
by students in my Legal Negotiation course. Such actors erroneously equate
discourteous behavior with effective advocacy. They use these techniques as
a substitute for negotiation proficiency. Capable negotiators recognize that
discourteous behavior is the least effective means of inducing competent
opponents to give in to bargaining requests.117
Lawyers should never employ tactics that are merely intended to
humiliate or harass opponents. Model Rule 4.4(a) provides that "a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,
delay, or burden a third person. . ."118 Highly competitive win-lose
negotiators may seek to achieve the complete annihilation of adversaries
through rude and degrading conduct. Although such behavior may induce a
few unskilled and timid persons to concede more than they should, proficient
bargainers would not allow such tactics to weaken their resolve. In fact, such
114 N.Y. State Bar Ethics Op. 782 (2004).
115 Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm. Op. 2007-02 (2007).
116 Me. Bd. of Bar Overseers Professional Ethics Conun. Op. 196 (2008).
117 See Jonathan R. Cohen, The Ethics of Respect in Negotiation, 18 NEGOT. J. 115,
118 (2002).
118 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2008).
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conduct would be likely to have the opposite effect. They would refuse to
move to avoid exploitation by such unprofessional opponents.
Uncivil and unprofessional conduct is not only morally reprehensible,
but it also exposes the offensive actors to recriminations that could subvert
their future bargaining encounters. Persons offended by rude tactics would
work to deny such individuals what they wanted to achieve in future
interactions, and they would inform their colleagues of the unprofessional
nature of their approach. Persons who know of the negative reputations of
hard bargainers would thoroughly prepare for negotiations with such actors,
and would work to deny those persons the concessions they seek to obtain
through openly intimidating behavior. Legal negotiators need to recall the
sagacious advice they received from parents during their formative years:
"You get far more with honey than with vinegar!"ll 9
When attorneys use personally offensive tactics to harass or intimidate
opponents, their behavior should be found to violate Rule 4.4(a). Such
conduct really has no purpose other than to "burden third persons." If bar
associations were to believe that the general language of Rule 4.4(a) does not
clearly cover such rude actions, they should consider amendments to make it
unequivocally clear that nasty and personally insulting behavior is
unprofessional and unethical. If a few highly offensive practitioners were
disciplined for wholly unacceptable conduct, bar members contemplating
such actions would be deterred, and other attorneys would find practice more
pleasant.
Many negotiations are conducted through telephone conversations. In the
near future, such interactions will be conducted by video phones via internet
connections. Since most individuals do not hear all of the words spoken
during these discussions-and would undoubtedly miss many nonverbal
signals emanating from opposing counsel-they may be tempted to secretly
record their bargaining conversations to enable them to review those
interactions carefully once they have ended. Would such behavior be ethical?
Although federal law does not prohibit the secret taping of telephone calls by
one of the participants without the other party's knowledge, some state laws
make such conduct illegal. 120 In those jurisdictions, it would clearly be
improper for lawyers to secretly tape telephone conversations with other
attorneys.
119 See Jonathan R. Cohen, The Ethics of Respect in Negotiation, in WHAT'S FAIR:
ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 36, at 257-60.
120 See J. Pitulla, On the Record: The Ethics of Secretly Taping Phone
Conversations, 80 A.B.A. J. 102 (Feb. 1994).
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In states where it is not unlawful for one party to secretly tape phone
conversations with others, would it be ethical for negotiating lawyers to tape
discussions with opposing counsel? Some state bar associations have
indicated that where secret taping is not proscribed, attorneys do not behave
unethically when they engage in such behavior.121 Other state bar
associations, however, have reached the opposite conclusion, believing that
attorneys conducting telephone interactions with other lawyers have the right
to expect those discussions to remain untaped without the knowledge and
consent of both participants. 122 I agree with this perspective. When legal
representatives interact-by telephone or even in person-they should not
fear that their conversations are being taped for future examination by
opposing counsel unless they have expressly agreed to such an approach.
Proposed Rule 4.3 of the Discussion Draft of the ABA Model Rules
would have precluded attorneys from concluding agreements "the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know ... would be held to be unconscionable as
a matter of law. . ."123 This provision would have codified the admonition of
Judge Alvin Rubin to avoid the negotiation of "unconscionable deals." 124
This provision was omitted from the final draft, most likely because of its
superfluous nature. If bargained agreements are "unconscionable as a matter
of law," they are subject to legal challenges that may negate their
enforceability. Thus, it behooves legal representatives to avoid the
consummation of truly unconscionable accords.
What about seemingly one-sided arrangements that have not been
procured through improper means and do not constitute legally
unconscionable agreements? Should it be considered unethical or morally
reprehensible for attorneys to obtain such contracts? Such a concept would
place the responsible lawyers in a tenuous position. If courts would be
unlikely to find the resulting accords unlawful and the opposing parties were
perfectly willing to enter into the apparently skewed arrangements, should
the prevailing legal representatives refuse to consummate the deals simply
because they think they may unreasonably disadvantage their opponents? 25
Why should the subjective personal judgments of these sanctimonious
121 See id
122 Id.
123 See Lowenthal, supra note 19, at 103 (emphasis omitted).
124 See Rubin, supra note 2, at 591 and accompanying text.
125 See generally Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 NEGOT. J.
223 (1993); John Richardson, How Negotiators Choose Standards of Fairness: A Look at
Empirical Evidence and Some Steps Toward a Process Model, 12 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV.
415 (2007).
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lawyers take precedence over the willingness of opposing parties to
effectuate the proposed exchanges, and the right of their own clients to obtain
the benefits of the bargains that have been struck?' 26 These individuals may
not know-and may never know-why their opponents found these deals
acceptable. Their adversaries may have been aware of factual or legal
circumstances that either undermined their own positions or bolstered those
of the other side.
Picture the situation where the claimant attorney believes that $500,000
would constitute a "fair" resolution of the underlying dispute. During the
bargaining discussions, it becomes clear that the opposing lawyer thinks the
plaintiff deserves more. She offers $850,000. The claimant representative
contacts his client and indicates that the defendant offered $850,000, but he
decided to accept $500,000 due to his belief that the $850,000 figure is
"excessive." I could not imagine many clients who would be satisfied with
such a conclusion. At a minimum, the lawyer would be under an obligation
under Model Rule 1.4 to promptly inform his client of the defendant's
offer, 127 and Model Rule 1.2(a) would require him to "abide by [his] client's
decision whether to settle [the] matter."1 28 I could easily imagine a legal
malpractice suit brought by such a client against the responsible attorney who
decided to forego the $850,000 offer in favor of the "more reasonable"
$500,000 figure. It would certainly be appropriate for such an attorney to
suggest to his client that the $850,000 offer seems excessive, but if the client
decides to accept the higher figure, I think the lawyer would be obliged to
follow the client's instructions. 129
Once negotiators achieve final agreements, one side usually drafts the
actual terms. If an attorney were to deliberately change a term or delete
something that was agreed upon, the client could be held liable for fraud and
the legal representative would be subject to discipline.130 Negotiators have a
clear duty to prepare documents that represent the terms the parties intended
to constitute their accord. Suppose one side prepares the agreement, and the
126 See Wendel, supra note 37, at 52 ("Lawyers' personal moral beliefs ... should
not be interposed between the client and the client's otherwise lawful objectives.");
Norton, supra note 24, at 552-56.
127 Comment 2 to Rule 1.4 explicitly imposes this obligation on attorneys
negotiating on behalf of clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (2008).
128 Id. at R. 1.2(a).
129 See Stephen L. Pepper, A Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 616 ("When the client's interest
and the professional's interest conflict, the professional is to forgo his interest in favor of
the client's.").
130 See, e.g., Crane v. State Bar, 635 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1981).
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opposing party realizes that the drafter has inadvertently omitted a provision
agreed upon. Although no Model Rule explicitly addresses this situation,
ABA Formal Opinion 86-1518 (1986) indicated that the party aware of the
omission should contact the drafting attorney to correct the omission.
Suppose the attorney representing Side B in a negotiation believes that
Side A has agreed to pay Side B $28 million. When she receives the draft
agreement from Side A, the document indicates that Side A is to pay Side B
$30 million. Would the Side B legal representative be under an obligation to
notify the Side A lawyer of this apparent mistake? I think the answer is yes,
but I think she should do so carefully. During the rush to conclude bargaining
interactions, parties often exchange terms quickly. It is possible that Side A
actually suggested the $30 million figure in exchange for some final
concessions being made by Side B. She should thus contact the Side A
representative and indicate that she cannot recall the precise amount agreed
upon. If the Side A lawyer affirms the $30 million figure, she should accept
this representation. On the other hand, if the Side A representative realizes
his mistake and suggests that $28 million was the amount actually intended,
the Side B lawyer should accept the correction.131
May attorneys who represent clients in civil actions arising out of
arguably criminal conduct (e.g., a sexual harassment lawsuit arising from
physical conduct by the defendant) suggest the possibility of criminal
charges being filed if the civil suit negotiations are not resolved in a
satisfactory manner? DR 7-105(A) of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, which is still followed by a few jurisdictions, states that
lawyers "shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter."1 32 This
provision might be read to prevent the mention of possible criminal
prosecution to advance civil suit negotiations. Nonetheless, courts have
acknowledged that neither DR 7-105(A), nor laws proscribing extortion or
compounding of felonies, should be interpreted to prevent civil litigants from
mentioning the possibility of criminal action if related civil claims are not
resolved, or to preclude clients from agreeing to forego the filing of criminal
charges in exchange for compensation to be paid to resolve the civil
131 But cf Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n Prof 1 Responsibility & Ethics Comm.
Op. 520 (2007) (indicating that an attorney who realizes that a client mistakenly received
settlement over payment may not unilaterally notify opposing counsel, but must instead
apprise the client of any errors and abide by the client's decision whether or not to
disclose the mistakes). See generally Lawyer who Detects Settlement Overpayment Must
Tell Client, but May Not Alert Opponent, 76 U.S. L. WK. 2148 (2007).
132 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1981).
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matters. 133 Legal representatives must be careful, however, not to use the
threat of criminal prosecution to obtain more than is owed to their clients, or
have their clients agree not to testify at future criminal trials. "Seeking
payment beyond restitution in exchange for foregoing criminal prosecution
or seeking any payments in exchange for not testifying at a criminal
trial . .. are still clearly prohibited."l 34 In a similar case, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that it was unethical for an attorney to threaten the possibility of
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage regarding negotiations
pertaining to a related civil matter. 135 A threat to invoke criminal charges to
enhance one's position in an unrelated civil dispute would almost certainly
be improper because of the extortionate nature of such a threat.136
The Model Rules do not contain any provision analogous to DR 7-
105(A), and it is clear that the drafters intentionally chose not to prohibit the
threat of criminal action to advance civil suit settlement discussions
pertaining to the same operative circumstances.137 As a result, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility indicated in
ABA Formal Opinion 92-363 (1992) that it is not unethical under the Model
Rules for attorneys to mention the possibility of criminal charges during civil
suit negotiations, so long as they do "not attempt to exert or suggest improper
influence over the criminal process." 38 Nevertheless, legal representatives
must still not demand excessive compensation that may contravene
applicable extortion statutes or promise that their clients will not testify at
future criminal trials because such a commitment would contravene public
policy.139
VI. ETHICAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO COLLABORATIVE LAW AND
COOPERATIVE LAW ARRANGEMENTS
The Collaborative Law movement began in the early 1990s by family
law practitioners who wanted to decrease the adversarial nature of their
133 See, e.g., Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1992).
134 Id. at 727.
135 In re Charles, 618 P.2d 1281 (Or. 1980).
136 See Bluestein v. State Bar, 529 P.2d 599 (Cal. 1974).
137 See Joanne Pitulla, Pay or I'll File Charges: Using the Ultimate Threat Against
an Opposing Party, 78 A.B.A. J. 106 (Oct. 1992).
138 Id.
139 Id.
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bargaining interactions. 140 Family law disputes often involve highly
emotional issues that significantly affect divorcing spouses and their
children. Many attorneys specializing in this area have functioned in a tough
and competitive manner. As family law practitioners began to appreciate the
fact that this adversarial approach generated negative consequences both for
themselves and their clients, a number of innovative lawyers decided to
develop a more open and cooperative style based upon the Getting to Yes
model.
Family law practitioners and their clients execute a four-way agreement
specifying the cooperative/problem-solving approach they will follow. The
participants promise to be completely open and to share all relevant
information on a voluntary basis. They interact in a professional and
respectful manner designed to generate mutually beneficial and jointly
efficient settlement agreements with minimum discomfort to the lawyers and
their clients. The legal negotiators are open and direct, and will never resort
to bluffing, puffing, and other value-claiming behavior. The most
controversial aspect of their four-way agreement acknowledges that if the
current parties are unable to reach a settlement, the lawyers will be
disqualified and not be permitted to take the underlying dispute to trial. The
clients will have to retain other counsel to carry out that function.
The major ethical issue thus far examined with respect to the propriety of
Collaborative Law arrangements is the disqualification provision. The
Colorado Bar found that the disqualification obligation contravened Model
Rule 1.7(a)(2),141 which forbids an attorney from representing a client if
there is a significant risk that the client's representation may be "materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to . . . a third person," unless (1) the
140 See Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J. DIsP. RESOL. 131,
132-33 (2008). See generally NANCY J. CAMERON, COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE
DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE (2004); SHEILA M. GuTrERMAN, COLLABORATIVE LAW: A
NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2004); KATHERINE E. STONER, DIVORCE
WrrHOUT COURT: A GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE (2006);
PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN
DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION (2001); PAULINE H. TESLER & PEGGY THOMPSON,
COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO RESTRUCTURE YOUR
FAMILY, RESOLVE LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE (2006); STUART G.
WEBB & RON D. OUSKY, THE COLLABORATIVE WAY TO DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY
METHOD THAT RESULTS IN LESS STRESS, LOWER COSTS, AND HAPPIER KIDS-WrrHOUT
GOING TO COURT (2006); William H. Schwab, Collaborative Law: A Closer Look at an
Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 351 (2004); Richard W. Shields, On
Becoming a Collaborative Professional: From Paradigm Shifting to Transformative
Learning Through Critical Reflection and Dialogue, 2008 J. DISP. RES. 427 (2008).
141 Colo. Bar Ethics Comm. Op. 115 (2007).
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lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected,
and (2) the client consents to the representation after consultation with the
attorney.142 The Colorado Bar found that the disqualification provision
creates an obligation to third persons-opposing counsel and opposing
clients-that involves a conflict between the lawyer and his or her client that
cannot be cured by mere client consent. 143 On the other hand, the American
Bar Association considered the same issue and concluded that the potential
conflict was not so insurmountable that a client could not consent to the
disqualification provision.'"
Before client consent is acceptable, lawyers should be obliged to explain
in detail the potential consequences of the disqualification provision. If cases
are not resolved amicably, new attorneys will have to be retained, those legal
representatives will have to become familiar with all of the relevant case
information, and legal costs are likely to increase substantially. While the
likelihood of such a result is generally low, especially where the
Collaborative Law attorneys are working diligently to avoid the need for
litigation, clients must appreciate the negative consequences that might arise
if mutual arrangements cannot be achieved.
Ethical issues can also arise under Model Rule 1.2(c), which provides
that "[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed
consent."1 45 Collaborative Law practitioners have agreed among themselves
to avoid many traditional negotiating tactics that might advance their own
client interests at the expense of opposing parties. ABA Formal Opinion 07-
447 found that the Collaborative Law Agreement limitations did not
contravene Rule 1.2(c), so long as they did not interfere with the concomitant
attorney duties of competence and diligence. New Jersey Bar Ethics Opinion
699146 indicated that lawyers must initially determine whether their
commitment to Collaborative Law rules would be "reasonable" under Rule
1.2. The opinion suggested that it would not be "reasonable" for attorneys to
require client commitment to their withdrawal where the legal representatives
believe there would be a significant possibility the collaborative process
would fail and the clients would have to retain the services of replacement
142 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2), (b) (2008).
143 Colo. Bar Ethics Comm. Op. 115 (2007).
144 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007); see
Lawrence P. McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative Law: Consideration of Its
Use in a Legal Aid Program for Resolving Family Law Disputes, 2008 J. DIsP. RESOL.
465, 482-84 (2008).
145 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2008).
146 New Jersey Bar Ethics Op., 182 N.J.L.J. 1055 (2005).
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attorneys.147 After they assess the potential risks associated with the
Collaborative Law Rules, attorneys should carefully explain those risks to
their clients to be certain that client consent to Collaborative Law
representation is truly informed.
To avoid the potential conflict problem associated with disqualification
provisions, some legal practitioners developed the Cooperative Law
approach, which follows the Collaborative Law rules, but with one critical
exception: Cooperative Law practitioners eliminated the attorney
disqualification provision.148 As a result, if their open and cooperative
discussions fail to generate settlement agreements, the originally retained
legal representatives may take the cases to trial.
The Collaborative Law movement completely embraces the
communitarian law concept. These are individuals who are uncomfortable
with the traditional give-and-take of the bargaining process and with the
overt or subtle deceit and competition associated with such interactions.
Rather than try to diminish rude or unprofessional behavior, while still
engaging in true legal negotiating, they have created a wholly artificial world
which is impossible to effectively monitor. How can they be certain that
Collaborative Law participants are being completely open? How can they be
sure no one has embellished their actual bottom line to obtain a bargaining
advantage?
It has been suggested that a large proportion of Collaborative Law
practitioners are "women in their fifties and sixties who are 'tired of arguing
with each other."' 49 This is consistent with the findings that "women are
more likely [than men] to avoid competitive situations, less likely to
acknowledge competitive wishes, and not likely to do as well [as men] in
competition." 5 0 It is also consistent with studies finding differences between
147 See also Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. Legal Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility Informal
Op. 2004-24 (2004).
148 See John Lande, Practical Insights From an Empirical Study of Cooperative
Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DisP. RESOL. 203, 205 (2008); CRAVER, supra note 8, at
16.
149 Lande, supra note 148, at 248; see Stacy Caplow & Shira Scheindlin, "Portrait
of a Lady": The Woman Lawyer in the 1980s, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 391, 422-23
(1990) (discussing female dissatisfaction with adversarial game-playing); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Diferent Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 49-60 (1985) (suggesting that women are less comfortable
with the adversarial system than men).
150 Irene P. Stiver, Work Inhibitions in Women, in WORK IN PROGRESS SERIES 2
(1983); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 42 (1982); Deborah L. Rhode,
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the way in which men and women approach lying. Males tend to lie for their
own benefit (self-oriented), while women tend to lie to make others feel good
and maintain relationships (other-oriented).' 5 Thus, it is not surprising that
women feel less comfortable with the "self-oriented" deception inherent in
traditional bargaining interactions and prefer the Collaborative Law
approach, which is designed to eliminate such mendacity.
The Collaborative Law movement has almost certainly excluded
competitive/adversarial negotiators from their groups. This is a beneficial
thing, since persons who are overtly competitive and adversarial tend to be
ineffective negotiators, as was found by Professors Williams and Schneider
in their studies.152 Collaborative Law people clearly wish to include only
cooperative/problem-solvers in their organizations. If they could accomplish
this objective, their interactions would be pleasant and their agreements
would be efficient. They would find bargaining interactions to be.enjoyable,
and their clients would have professional representation designed to
minimize client difficulties.
What if lawyers the Collaborative Law people think are
cooperative/problem-solvers are actually competitive/problem-solvers? On
the surface, both types of legal negotiators behave similarly. They are always
courteous and professional, and they work to generate efficient agreements.
They seem to be open with their critical information; they begin with
reasonable opening offers, and seek "fair" results. Nonetheless, skilled
competitive/problem-solvers disingenuously reflect the styles of
cooperative/problem-solvers for the purpose of claiming more of the
bargaining surplus for their own clients. Their first goal is to obtain good
terms for their own side before they work to maximize the joint returns
achieved. If they are able to delude cooperative/problem-solving opponents
into believing that they are also cooperative/problem-solvers, they can
exploit the naive openness of such persons.153 Such competitive/problem-
solvers are really the most deceptive negotiators. They induce opponents to
Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547,
1550-51 (1993).
151 See Bella M. DePaulo, Deborah A. Kashy, Susan E. Kirkendol & Melissa M.
Wyer, Lying in Everyday Life, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 979, 987 (1996); see
also Roger J. Volkema, Ethicality in Negotiations: An Analysis ofPerceptual Similarities
and Diferences Between Brazil and the United States, 45 J. Bus. REs. 59, 64-65 (1999)
(indicating that females hold stricter judgments than males with respect to what
constitutes ethical negotiating behavior).
152 See WILLIAMS, supra note 44; Schneider, supra note 48.
153 See Rosenberger, supra note 38, at 625-27 (lawyers who are naively open with
manipulative opponents place their clients at risk).
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believe they are being completely open and direct, when their openness is
limited and they are employing deceptive behavior to enhance their own
circumstances.1 54
How can Collaborative Law participants prevent exploitation by
opportunistic and manipulative competitive/problem-solvers? They can do
what proficient cooperative/problem-solvers now do and disclose their
important information slowly. If they are convinced their openness is being
reciprocated, they can continue to be open. On the other hand, if they suspect
that their openness is not being fully reciprocated, they must behave more
strategically themselves by being less open to avoid exploitation.155 They can
alternatively do what many na'ive cooperative/problem-solvers do and simply
pretend that competitive/problem-solvers do not exist. This is a make-believe
world that allows cooperative/problem-solvers to enjoy their interactions
even when they compromise the interests of their own clients to enable
themselves to avoid difficult interactions they do not like. While this
approach may enable these legal representatives to avoid the rigors of true
bargaining, it ill serves their clients.
Some Collaborative Law practitioners may put their own interests-and
the interests of opposing counsel members of the Collaborative Law
movement-ahead of the interests of their own clients in a manner that
seems to contravene Rule 1.3. They are not really acting with the "reasonable
diligence" required by that Rule. As Comment 1 indicates, "[a] lawyer
must . .. act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."' 56 Comment I goes on
to acknowledge that "[a] lawyer is not bound . .. to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client," and it further states that "[t]he lawyer's
duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive
tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process
with courtesy and respect." 57
Since proficient negotiators generally behave professionally and
courteously, the commitment of Collaborative Law practitioners to behave
154 See Hartwell, supra note 57, at 185-88 (1991); Lowenthal, supra note 19, at 82
("[T]he competitive negotiator feigning collaboration will have a substantial tactical
advantage, at least in the short run.").
155 See J. Gregory Dees & Peter C. Cramton, Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral
Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Practice, 1 Bus. ETHIcs Q. 143, 147-48
(1991); Peppet, supra note 31, at 482-83.
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2008).
157 Id. Richard Stanley states, "[a] pure client-oriented system of ethics has never
been our collective experience within the bar. . ." Richard C. Stanley, A Professional
Model ofEthics, 47 LOY. L. REV. 773, 789 (2001).
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respectfully raises no ethical dilemmas. In addition, if their commitment to
cooperative interactions does not oblige them to be overly generous to clients
and attorneys on the other side, they would similarly encounter no problems
under Rule 1.3.158 Nonetheless, legal representatives should not be permitted
to place their own interest in avoiding the personal discomfort associated
with bargaining interactions ahead of the interests of their clients, and if they
allow their dislike for real bargaining to adversely affect the interests of their
clients, issues should arise under this provision.159 "[A] lawyer should never
compromise the legitimate interest of a client for either the lawyer's own
personal interest or the interests of any other clients."' 60 Nor should they be
allowed to do so simply to maintain good relationships with other legal
practitioners.161
"[S]ome form of deceit, at least in the broadest sense of the word, is
inherent in all negotiations and that a lawyer with an obligation to obtain the
best result for a client cannot be expected, realistically, to negotiate outside
the context of everyday convention."1 62 Legal negotiators who ignore this
reality may feel more comfortable with bargaining interactions, but they
significantly risk the unknowing compromise of client interests. To the extent
they naively believe that no other practitioners are exaggerating or
embellishing client interests, they place their own clients at a distinct
disadvantage. It is as if they are playing poker on behalf of their clients with
158 See Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 73, 84-86 (2005); John Lande, Principles for Policymaking
About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 619,
680-81 (2007).
159 See Peppet, supra note 140, at 146-47; see also Perschbacher supra note 35, at
134. Perschbacher states:
[i]f lawyers are required to respect their adversaries' rights throughout the course of
representation, in the end the lawyer becomes representative of both parties and
guarantor of the fairness of their transaction. The adversary system would have to be
abandoned in negotiations. However desirable this may be as an ideal, it is
unacceptable and unworkable for the profession today.
Id.
160 Lowenthal, supra note 19, at 107 (emphasis in original).
161 See Emily T. Amanatullah, Michael W. Morris & Jared R. Curhan, Negotiators
Who Give Too Much: Unmitigated Communion, Relational Anxieties, and Economic
Costs in Distributive and Integrative Bargaining, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
723 (2008) (indicating that negotiators who are primarily concerned about the
maintenance of personal relationships with opposing parties often obtain less beneficial
results for their own side).
162 Steele, supra note 1, at 1399; see Peppet, supra note 65, at 91-92.
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their cards face up when they are not certain they are really able to see all of
the cards being held by their opponents. By the conclusion of the poker
game, the chips will most likely be on the opposing side of the table.
Collaborative Law attorneys may also encounter difficulties under Rule
1.7(a)(2) due to the "significant risk that the representation . .. will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to. . . a third
person. . ."163 Some Collaborative Law practitioners may be more
committed to their relationships with opposing Collaborative Law counsel
than they are to their own clients because of their on-going interactions with
such lawyers compared to their one-time representation of current clients. If
this factor were to diminish their commitment to the advancement of client
interests during their negotiations with opposing counsel, significant issues
could arise under this Rule.
Collaborative Law practitioners who do not wish to engage in
conventional legal negotiations should be obliged to inform their clients of
their unwillingness to further client interests through this distasteful process.
They should also have to advise clients of their commitment to the
Collaborative Law attorneys on the other side. They should explain how they
hope that a commitment to the cooperative/problem-solving approach will
benefit clients by diminishing inter-client difficulties and by seeking the
development of mutually efficient accords. On the other hand, they should
note that competitive/problem-solvers might be able to obtain advantages for
their own clients without these representatives being aware of their deceptive
behavior. Clients have the right to know of attorney willingness to sacrifice
client interests to serve their own desire to avoid unpleasant endeavors and to
advance relationships with other lawyers. I doubt that many Collaborative
Law attorneys would be willing to make such overt acknowledgements to
their clients. Most will continue to naively pretend that no members of their
group could possibly behave in a deceptively opportunistic fashion.
The issue bar associations have primarily focused on has concerned the
disqualification provisions associated with Collaborative Law four-way
agreements. This obligation is designed to maximize cooperative bargaining
behavior by making it clear that negotiators who fail to achieve mutual
accords may not continue to represent their clients if the matters are litigated.
Given the fact that fewer than five percent-and often only one or two
percent-of marital dissolution cases are resolved through formal
adjudications, the disqualification provision is likely to have a minimal
impact on clients. This is especially true for Collaborative Law participants
who are far less likely to litigate than their competitive/adversarial cohorts. If
163 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2008).
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clients are unequivocally informed of the potential impact of the
disqualification provision and they knowingly consent to this term hoping to
benefit from the more cooperative approach being employed by the attorneys
involved, I do not believe that state bar associations should find these
Collaborative Law provisions to contravene the Model Rules based solely
upon this consideration. Nonetheless, bar associations should be certain that
attorneys have complied with Rules 1.3 and 1.7 by expressly discussing with
clients their commitment to a process designed to avoid the give-and-take
associated with traditional bargaining interactions and their focus on the
continuing relationships they have with other Collaborative Law
practitioners.
A recent empirical study by Professors Kathleen O'Connor and Peter
Carnevale should cause Collaborative Law proponents to think about the
degree to which they place joint attorney and client interests above the
interests of their own clients.164 Their study dealt with so-called "common-
value issues" that both sides would like to have resolved in an identical
manner even though they are unaware of their positional overlap. The
exercise concerned a divorce situation in which the wife desired custody of
the children and the husband preferred that she have custody. Some of the
negotiating dyads were completely open regarding their interests with respect
to this issue. Other dyads involved participants who could be disingenuous
with respect to this issue, allowing husband representatives to demand
custody to enable that side to exchange this issue for other actually valued
terms later during the interactions. O'Connor and Carnevale found that the
individualistically motivated dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than the
cooperatively motivated dyads.165 This was based upon the fact that the
individualistically motivated dyad participants established higher aspirations
for themselves than did the cooperatively motivated dyad participants. This
study would suggest that Collaborative Law negotiators should be careful not
to allow their distaste for the give-and-take of traditional bargaining
interactions to limit the goals they set for their own clients. If the
Collaborative Law participants on both sides of such exchanges establish
modest aspirations and concentrate on making sure that neither side gains at
the other side's expense, both sides may end up with terms that do not
maximize their potential joint returns. This would suggest that Collaborative
Law negotiators should remember to establish beneficial goals initially for
164 Kathleen M. O'Connor & Peter J. Carnevale, A Nasty but Effective Negotiation
Strategy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue, 23 PERsONALYTY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 504 (1997).
165 See id. at 512-13.
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their respective clients before they begin to interact with opposing attorneys.
The more they work to advance the interests of their own clients-while
working to cooperate and maximize the joint returns achieved-the more
likely they will be to generate optimal terms for both sides.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers negotiate frequently, but many feel uncomfortable with the
deception inherent in most bargaining interactions. They do not like to
exaggerate their positions for personal gain or to misrepresent their true
client settlement intentions. Although Model Rule 4.1 prohibits the knowing
misrepresentation of material fact, Comment 2 expressly notes that due to
accepted bargaining conventions, advocate statements regarding client values
and client settlement intentions do not concern "material fact." This
exception is actually quite narrow. It merely permits "puffing" and
"embellishment," but no overt or subversive misstatements of true material
fact. Attorneys who misrepresent material information risk the loss of
reputation for integrity, which will significantly undermine their ability to
practice law.
Many law school teachers and a growing group of practicing attorneys
have decided to reject the conventional bargaining approach in favor of an
idealized communitarian style which is based-not upon how most legal
negotiators behave-but rather upon how communitarians think they should
behave. A number of lawyers, particularly in the family law area, have
established the Collaborative Law and the Cooperative Law movements to
guarantee that participating attorneys will be entirely open and candid with
each other to ensure pleasant and efficient interactions. These practitioners
assume that they will all behave in a cooperative/problem-solving manner,
but ignore the possibility that some members may adopt the hybrid
competitive/problem-solving style designed to make them appear open when
they are actually using manipulative tactics designed to enable them to claim
a greater share of the joint surplus for their own side.
Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law practitioners may improperly
place their own desire to avoid the rigors of conventional legal negotiating
ahead of the interests of their own clients. They also want to maintain
beneficial relationships with the attorneys on the other side. Because of the
potential conflict created between their duties to their own clients and the
interests of opposing counsel, Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law
practitioners should be required to explain to their own clients the degree to
which they wish to avoid personally stressful situations and to maintain
harmonious relationships with opposing lawyers. Only where they obtain the
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informed consent of their clients to this practice should they be permitted to
engage in such self-serving and unconventional bargaining.
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